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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme 
Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the district court erred in entering summary judgment against 
Appellant Gary B. Stanford ("Stanford") in the amount of $1,009,872.35 
where there was a question of fact and ambiguity as to whether Stanford's 
guarantee was limited to a total amount of $500,000.00. 
This Court reviews a district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial 
of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Orvis v. Johnson, 
2008 UT 2, ^ | 6, 177 P.3d 600. Stanford preserved this issue below in his memoranda in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and in a hearing before Judge 
Quinn. (R. 161-168; 501-503; 781 Hearings Tran. at 9-II.)1 
2. Whether the district court erred by not giving Stanford credit for payments 
which Stanford made to the Plaintiffs where the Plaintiffs knew the 
payments came from Stanford and not the debtor. 
1
 Citation conventions as used in this brief are as follows: *WR." refers to the record 
on appeal, "Hearings Tran." refers to the transcript of the hearings held before Judge 
Quinn on March 13, 2006, February 16, 2007, and April 29, 2008, and included in the 
record on appeal at page 781, "Add. Ex." refers to an exhibit included in this brieFs 
Addendum. 
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This Court reviews a district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial 
of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Orvis, 2008 UT 2, |^ 
6. Stanford preserved this issue below by motion and at a hearing before Judge Quinn. 
(R. 168-170; R. 781 Hearings Tran. at 9-11.) 
3. Whether the district court should reduce the $1,009,872.35 judgment 
amount by the difference between the fair market value of the commercial 
property which the Plaintiffs foreclosed on and purchased where Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-32 requires such a reduction. 
Due to the exceptional procedural circumstances of this case, this issue was not 
preserved on appeal below. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(B), 
Stanford provides the following statement of grounds for seeking review of this new 
issue: 
In April of 1994, Stanford and his business associate Richard Buckway 
("Buckway") entered into an agreement with the Parks to purchase a commercial real 
estate property in Ogden, Utah (the "Ogden Property"). (R. 82.) The parties later agreed 
that as part of the Ogden Property purchase, Snowmass, LLC ("Snowmass") would 
assume the Parks' obligation to pay a first position deed on the Ogden Property in favor 
of Security Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Security Mutual"). (R. 154.) Snowmass 
assumed the Security Mutual loan and the Parks were released from liability on the 
Security Mutual Note. (R. 160.) 
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On or about July 1, 1995, Snovvmass and the Parks executed a Trust Deed Note 
wherein Snowmass promised to pay the Parks $645,683.27. (R. 3.) Stanford signed the 
Note in his individual capacity as a guarantor. (R. at 4.) 
In December of 2007, the Parks purchased the Security Mutual Note back. (R. at 
601; 616-619.) After granting summary judgment in favor of the Parks, the district court 
issued its final judgment against Stanford on June 3, 2008. (R. 759-763.) The 
Judgment's total amount was $1,009,872.35, and was comprised of $500,000.00 in 
principal based on Stanford's guarantee, $508,463.91 in interest on the principal amount, 
and $1,408.44 in costs. (R. 760.) At the time the Judgment was issued, the Parks were 
the holders of the Security Mutual Note and had not begun any foreclosure proceedings 
on the Ogden Property. 
However, on June 26, 2008, the Parks' legal counsel, Keith W. Meade ("Meade") 
issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale which scheduled a public auction of the Ogden Property 
on July 31, 2008. (A copy of the Notice of Trustee's Sale is included in this briefs 
Addendum as Exhibit *WA.") The public auction was held on July 31, 2008, and the Parks 
purchased the Ogden Property for a credit bid of $200,000.00. (A copy of the bid price is 
included in this briePs Addendum as Exhibit "B.") The Parks had previously submitted 
expert testimony that the Ogden Property's market value as of April 21, 2006, was 
between $425,000.00 and $450,000.00. (R. 430-431.) 
Utah Code Ann § 57-1-32 requires that a court deduct the fair market value of a 
property on the date of its sale pursuant to a trust deed from any judgment amount 
rendered against a debtor Utah Code Ann § 57-1-32 (2008) The Utah Supreme Court 
has extended this protection to guarantors as well See Surety Life Ins Co v Smith, 892 
P 2d 1, 3 (Utah 1995) Accordingly, a guarantor must be afforded the benefit of having 
any potential judgment against him reduced by the fair market value of the property on 
the date of its sale The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of this protection 
is to prevent a creditor from receiving a double recovery where he nets not only a 
deficiency (udgment but also the property itself Id 
In this case, the issue of whether the Parks' judgment should ha\e been reduced by 
the difference between the fair market value of the Ogden Property and their $200,000 00 
purchase price was never presented to the district court because the facts giving rise to 
this issue had not >et occurred Fven though the Parks had purchased the Security Mutual 
Note while the case was still before the district court the> had not vet foreclosed on the 
Ogden Property or purchased the Property prior to the court s final judgment 
A litigant who fails to raise an issue before the district court is generally barred 
from raising it for the first time on an appeal State v Lopez, 886 P 2d 1105 1113 (Utah 
1994) However, this Court has recognized an exception to this rule where exceptional 
circumstances" are present State \ Irvv in 924 P 2d 5 7 (Utah Ct App 1996) Utah 
courts hav e carved out this exceptional utcumstances exception as a safetv device,' 
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to assure that 'manifest injustice' does not result from the failure to consider an issue on 
appeal." Id. quoting State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
This Court has held that the "exceptional circumstances" exception is not a precise 
doctrine "which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term 
used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even though an issue was not 
raised below . . . unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the 
merits of the issue on appeal." Id. at 8. Such "unique procedural circumstances" existed 
in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), where the Utah Supreme Court noted that a 
change in the law or the settled interpretation of the law which arose after trial justified 
consideration of the appellant's issue raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 10. 
In this case, "exceptional circumstances" exist which permit this Court's 
consideration of an issue which was impossible to raise in the district court. As set forth 
above, the facts giving rise to Stanford's claim that his judgment should be reduced by the 
difference in the fair market value of the Ogden Property and the Parks' $200,000.00 
purchase price did not occur until after the court had already entered judgment against 
him. Accordingly, like the appellant in Lopez, it was impossible for Stanford to raise this 
issue prior to the entry of the judgment against him. 
Stanford contends that there are sufficient facts in the record on appeal to 
demonstrate the viability of this issue where the Parks held the Security Mutual Note in 
their favor against Stanford and where there the Ogden Property was appraised at 
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$425,000.00 to $450,000.00. (R. 601; 616-619; 430-431.) Moreover, the intent of the 
"exceptional circumstances" exception would be served in this case where absent review 
of this issue Stanford will be potentially be liable for a judgment which should be reduced 
by no less than $225,000.00. Furthermore, as a guarantor, the Utah Supreme Court has 
extended § 57-32-1 to Stanford and Stanford is therefore entitled to its protection. 
Additionally, consideration of this issue is germane to the other issues presented on this 
appeal where the issue concerns the amount of the judgment which Stanford should 
ultimately be liable for. 
Utah appellate courts permit the review of an issue not presented to a trial court as 
a "safety device" to assure that "manifest injustice" does not result. State v. Irwin, 924 
P.2d at 8. In this case, such a safety mechanism is necessary to consider whether the 
district court's judgment amount should be reduced as a matter of law by virtue of U.C.A. 
§ 57-32-1. Additionally, a judgment against Stanford for $200,000.00 to $250,000,000 
more than it should be constitutes the type of manifest injustice the "exceptional 
circumstances" exception was meant to prevent where the Parks also now own the Ogden 
Property. 
Stanford did not present this issue below because the facts giving rise to this issue 
had not yet occurred. It was not because he simply neglected it or because his legal 
counsel at the time chose not to argue it as tactical strategy. The unique procedural 
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circumstances of this case rendered it impossible for Stanford to raise this issue below. 
Accordingly, Stanford respectfully asks the Court to permit review of this issue on appeal, 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Stanford believes that interpretation of the following rule and statute may be 
determinative of portions of this appeal. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as 
provided in Section 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to 
recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as 
security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was 
sold, and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. Before rendering 
judgment, the court shall bind the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. 
The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the 
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's 
fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action 
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the Parks' double recover of a debt which Stanford had 
guaranteed. Stanford signed various documents wherein he guaranteed Snow mass' 
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payments to the Parks. Stanford's guarantee was limited to a total amount of 
$500,000.00. However, when Snowmass failed to fulfill its obligation, Stanford paid the 
Parks over $750,000.00 of his own money to honor his guarantee. Notwithstanding 
Stanford's payments in excess of his personal guarantee, the Parks sought, and received, a 
judgment against Stanford for over a million dollars. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The Parks filed a Complaint against Stanford seeking to recover an alleged 
$761,948.00 debt which Stanford had guaranteed. Soon after filing their Complaint, the 
Parks moved for partial summary judgment and sought a determination that: (I) Stanford 
was liable to them based upon his guarantee, and (2) that Stanford was not entitled to 
offset over $750,000.00 in payments which he had made to the Parks against his 
guarantee. The Parks argued that a July 1995 Trust Deed Note constituted the final and 
integrated agreement between the parties and that pursuant to that Note, Stanford was 
liable for $500,000.00 plus interest on that principal amount. 
In August of 2006, the Parks filed another motion for summary judgment which 
sought a final judgment against Stanford based on his personal guarantee. Stanford filed 
opposing memoranda to the Parks' motions for summary judgment wherein he argued 
that there were genuine issues of fact regarding the amount of his guarantee and whether 
his personal payments to the Parks in accordance with his guarantee should be credited 
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towards that guarantee. Hearings on the motions for summary judgment were held before 
Judge Quinn on March 13, 2006, February 16, 2007, and April 29, 2008. 
III. Disposition Below 
At the March 13, 2006, hearing on the Parks' motion for partial summary 
judgment, Judge Quinn concluded as a matter of law that none of Stanford's payments 
could be applied towards his $500,000.00 guarantee. Judge Quinn stated from the bench 
that since there was no evidence that Stanford had directed the Parks to apply his personal 
payments towards his guarantee, he was not entitled to an offset of those payments as 
matter of law. On June 5, 2006, the court issued an Order reiterating its ruling at the 
March 13, 2006, hearing. (A copy of this Order is included in this briefs addendum as 
Ex. F.) In its Order, the court also stated that it could not determine as a matter of law 
what amount Stanford was liable for by virtue of his guarantee. 
At a hearing on April 29, 2008, Judge Quinn granted the Parks' remaining motion 
for summary judgment. On June 3, 2008, the trial court entered a Judgment against 
Stanford in the total amount of $1,009,872.35, together with interest at 15% per annum. 
(A copy of the Judgment is included in this briefs addendum as Ex. F.) This amount was 
comprised of $500,000.00 in principal, $508,463.91 in interest on the principal amount, 
and $ 1,408.44 in costs. Stanford filed a notice of appeal on July 2, 2008. 
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IV. Statement of Facts 
A. Stanford's Involvement in the Purchase of the Ogden Property 
1. On April 1, 1994, Gary B. Stanford ("Stanford") and Richard Buckway 
('"Buckway") entered into a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") with Kang and 
Marsha Park (the "Parks") (R. 210; Add. Ex. C.)2 
2. Pursuant to the REPC, Stanford and Buckway agreed to purchase a 
commercial real estate property in Ogden, Utah (the "Ogden Property") from the Parks 
for $1,000,000.00. (R. 210; Add. Ex. C.) 
3. The REPC provided that Stanford would personally guarantee the payment 
of $500,000.00 plus interest. (R. 213; Add. Ex. C.) 
4. The REPC also provided that Stanford and Buckway would be responsible 
for Mr. Kang's obligations on a Deed of Trust and Security dated March 12, 1992, 
between Mr. Kang and Security Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Security Mutual"). 
5. The Ogden Property was subject to the Security Mutual Trust Deed which 
carried a balance of approximately $266,484.40 at the time the parties" executed the 
REPC. (R. 215; Add. Ex. C.) 
6. Stanford and Buckway took possession of the Ogden Property in May of 
1994 and soon after began to make monthly payments to the Parks. (R. 202.) 
2
 A copy of the April I, 1994, REPC is included in this briefs addendum as 
Exhibit "C." 
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7. Since there had not yet been an official closing on the Ogden Property, the 
Parks' attorney at the time Frederick S. Prince, Jr. ("Prince") sent a letter to Stanford and 
Buckway which summarized the REPC's essential terms. (R. 224-228.) 
8. In the letter, Prince summarized Stanford's guarantee as follows, "[t]his 
can only be interpreted as limiting Dr. Stanford's liability to the $500,000 amount" and 
later stated that Dr. Stanford's liability was limited to $500,000.00 (R. 225-226.) 
9. In approximately October of 1994, the parties mutually agreed to modify 
the terms of the REPC. Prince sent Stanford and Buckway another letter on October 11, 
1994, confirming the new contract terms. In that letter, Prince wrote that "Dr. Stanford 
will personally guarantee the Note, but his guarantee will be limited to a maximum 
liability of $500,000." (R. 230-231.) 
10. In connection with the Ogden Property purchase, the parties also agreed 
that Snowmass, LLC ("Snowmass"), a limited liability company which Stanford and 
Buckway were members of, would assume the Security Mutual Note. (R. 202.) 
11. On October 24, 1994, Prince sent Stanford and Buckway a letter setting 
forth the essential terms of the modified REPC.3 The letter stated that the purchase price 
would be reduced from $1,000,000.00 to $900,000.00. With respect to Stanford's 
1
 A copy of the October 24, 1994, contract is included in this briefs addendum as 
Exhibit "D " 
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guarantee, the Parks' attorney reiterated that "his guarantee will be limited to a maximum 
liability of $500,000." (R. 233-235; Add. Ex. D.) 
12. At the end of the letter, Prince included the language "AGREED AND 
ACCEPTED" and included signature lines for Stanford, Buckway, and the Parks. (R. 
235; Add. Ex. D.) 
13. Stanford, Buckway, and the Parks each signed the letter thereby accepting 
the REPC's new terms. (R. 235; Add. Ex. D.) 
14. Each of the recitals in the aforementioned documents were consistent with 
Stanford's intent that he only be liable on his guarantee for a maximum amount of 
$500,000.00. (R. 204.) 
15. Pursuant to their obligation, Stanford and Buckway arranged for Snowmass 
to assume the Security Mutual Note in approximately June of 1995. (R. 204.) 
16. Once Snowmass had arranged for assumption of the Security Mutual Note, 
the Parks' attorney prepared a Trust Deed Note dated July 1, 1995, (the "July Trust 
Deed") in the principal amount of $645,683.27. (R. 3-10.)4 
17. The July Trust Deed identified Snowmass as the Borrower rather than 
Stanford and Buckway like the previous documents had. (R. 3; Add. Ex. E.) 
4
 A copy of the July 1, 1995, Trust Deed Note is included in this briefs addendum 
as Exhibit **E." 
12 
18. The July Trust Deed contains the following guarantee language with 
respect to Stanford, 
By his signature, individually, on this note, Gary B. Stanford agrees to 
unconditionally guarantee the payment of this note, but in no even shall Gary B. 
Stanford's liability (excluding portions thereof attributable to interest and costs) 
when added to any deficiency judgment which may be entered against him by 
virtue of his guaranty of the Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. note (excluding 
interest and costs), exceed the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($500,000). 
(R. 4; Add. Ex. E.) 
19. The July Trust Deed's language that Stanford's $500,000.00 guaranty 
excluded portions attributable to interest was contrary to Stanford's intention as well as 
Prince's summation of the guarantee. (R. 205.) 
20. Buckway stated that it was always his and Stanford's intent that Stanford 
not guarantee any more than $500,000.00 of the total purchase price. (R. 370.) 
21. J.R. Christensen, a silent partner of Snowmass from 1994-1995 also stated 
that Stanford's guarantee was not to exceed $500,000.00. (R. 282.) 
22. The Jul} Trust Deed also states that "all other instruments evidencing or 
securing the indebtedness hereunder are hereby made part of this Note and are deemed 
incorporated herein in hill." (R. 4; Add. Ex. E.) 
B. Stanford Makes Payments to the Parks Pursuant to his Guarantee 
23. After taking possession of the Ogden Property, Snowmass began making 
payments to the Parks pursuant to the REPC. (R. 202.) 
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24. Those payments partially paid the amount owing to the Parks and partially 
paid the amounts owing on the Security Mutual Note. (R. 308.) 
25. However, in 1994 and 1995, Snowmass missed several payments it was 
required to make pursuant to the July Trust Deed. (R. 159; 203-205.) 
26. When Snowmass failed to make these payments, Mr. Park contacted 
Stanford directly to demand payment based on Stanford's personal guarantee. (R. 205; 
211-261.) 
27. To honor his personal guarantee, Stanford made payments to the Parks in 
excess of $750,000.00. These payments were made to fulfill the Parks' obligation under 
the Security Mutual Note, Snowmass' obligation under the Security Mutual Note, 
Snowmass' payment obligation under the July Trust Deed, and Stanford's guarantee of 
the July Trust Deed. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.) 
28. When Stanford made personal payments to the Parks, he did so believing 
that the Parks would credit those payments towards his $500,000.00 guarantee. (R. 161; 
207.) 
29-. Had Stanford known that the Parks were not crediting his personal 
payments towards his $500,000.00 guarantee, Stanford would not have made the 
payments upon the Parks" demand. (R. 161; 207.) 
30. At times Stanford would transfer his own funds into Snowmass' bank 
account so that Snowmass could make its payment to the Parks. (R. 159.) 
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C, Mr. Park Purchases the Security Mutual Note & Forecloses 
31. On or about December 19, 2007, Mr. Park purchased the Security Mutual 
Note which was secured by the Ogden Property. (R. 616.) 
32. On June 3, 2008, the district court entered its Judgment against Stanford in 
the amount of $1,009,872.35. (R. 759-761.) 
33. After the district court's Judgment was entered, Mr. Park began foreclosure 
proceedings on the Security Mutual Note. 
34. On June 26, 2008, the Parks' attorney, Keith W. Meade, acting as successor 
trustee, issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the Ogden Property. See Add. Ex. A. 
35. The Trustee's Sale was held on July 31, 2008. Id. 
36. The Parks were the only bidder at the Trustee's Sale and purchased the 
Ogden Property with a credit bid of $200,000.00. See Add. Ex. B. 
37. The estimated fair market value of the Ogden Property as of April 21, 
2006, was between $425,000.00 and $450,000.00 according to the Parks' expert. (R. 
430-431.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of the Parks 
where contractual ambiguities and questions of fact infested the case. While it is 
undisputed that Stanford signed the Juh Trust Deed as a guarantor, the unresolved 
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question of how much of Snowmass' obligation he guaranteed should have precluded the 
district court's grant of summary judgment. 
The July Trust Deed purportedly caps Stanford's guarantee at $500,000.00. 
However, it also provides that Stanford is liable for any interest on that $500,000.00 
amount, thereby exposing Stanford to liability on his guarantee well in excess of 
$500,000.00. While on its face this language may not appear ambiguous, the July Trust 
Deed incorporates by reference prior agreements entered into between the parties which 
unambiguously limit Stanford's guarantee to $500,000.00 total. The incorporation of 
these previous agreements calls into question whether Stanford's guarantee should 
include interest on the $500,000.00 principal amount and given this ambiguity, summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
The district court also erred by concluding as a matter of law that Stanford was not 
entitled to credit for the payments he made to the Parks pursuant to his guarantee. Courts 
have held that when a guarantor makes payments to the lender on behalf of the borrower, 
those pa\ments are credited against the guarantor's guarantee amount. In this case, the 
facts show that Stanford paid the Parks at least $750,000.00 on behalf of Snowmass 
pursuant to his guarantee and at the Parks' request. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the 
district court should have applied those payments to Stanford's $500,000.00 guaranty. 
Stanford contends that where he made at least $500,000,00 in payments his guaranty was 
extinguished and the district court's Judgment should be vacated. 
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Additionally, the district court erroneously focused its inquiry on whether Stanford 
and the Parks had an agreement as to how Stanford's personal payments would be 
applied. Stanford contends that the operative question is not whether Stanford directed 
the Parks to apply his payments to his guarantee, but whether the Parks knew that 
payments they received came from Stanford and not Snowmass. The law is well settled 
that when a lender receives a payment on a debt from the guarantor, or from the debtor 
with the guarantor's funds, and that creditor has actual knowledge that the guarantor is 
the source of the payment, the creditor is required to apply that payment towards the 
guaranteed debt. Accordingly, where the Parks knew they had received money from 
Stanford, his payments should be credited against his $500,000.00 guarantee as a matter 
of law. 
Finally, the district court should reduce the $1,009,872.35 judgment amount by the 
difference between the fair market value of the Ogden Property on the da\ of the trustee's 
sale and the Parks' $200,000.00 purchase price. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 applies to 
property that is subject to and ultimately sold by virtue of a trust deed. The purpose of 
this statute is to prevent a creditor from receiving the double recovery of a judgment as 
well as the underlying property. The Utah Supreme Court has extended § 57-1-32's reach 
to guarantors and therefore Stanford is entitled to such protection. Stanford therefore 
asks this Court to remand this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with § 
57-1-32. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHERE STANFORD'S GUARANTEE AMOUNT WAS 
AMBIGUOUS 
The maximum amount of Stanford's guarantee was ambiguous and therefore 
summary judgment was inappropriate. The Utah Supreme Court has held that ua motion 
for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached than an 
ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties 
intended." Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^  14, 43 P.3d 918 (internal 
quotation omitted). The district court concluded that Stanford was liable for not only his 
$500,000.00 principal guarantee, but also $508,463.91 in interesl on that principal 
amount. (R. 759-761.) Stanford contends that the July Trust Deed's guaranty is 
ambiguous as to whether Stanford's guarantee includes interest on the $500,000.00 
principal amount where prev ious agreements incorporated into the July Trust Deed did 
not contemplate such interest. 
A contract provision is deemed ambiguous if "it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms or other 
facial deficiencies.'" Peterson, 2002 UT 43 at ^19. When determining whether a contract 
term is ambiguous "the court is not bound to consider only the language of the contract" 
but **[a]ny relevant evidence must be considered." Id. 
In this case, the Jul} Trust Deed contains the following guarantee language, 
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By his signature, individually, on this note, Gary B. Stanford agrees to 
unconditionally guarantee the payment of this note, but in no even shall Gary B. 
Stanford's liability (excluding portions thereof attributable to interest and costs) 
when added to any deficiency judgment which may be entered against him by 
virtue of his guaranty of the Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. note (excluding 
interest and costs), exceed the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($500,000). 
(R. 4; Add. Ex. E.) At first blush, this language may not appear ambiguous. However, 
the July Trust Deed also includes an incorporation clause which provides as follows, 
w
*[s]uch Security Instruments and all other instruments evidencing or securing the 
indebtedness hereunder are hereby made part of this Note and are deemed incorporated 
herein in full." (Id.) Accordingly, the previous agreements related to the sale of the 
Ogden Property became part of the July Trust Deed and those documents evidence an 
ambiguity as to Stanford's guarantee amount. 
The first document incorporated into the July Trust Deed which demonstrates the 
ambiguity is a September 27, 1994, letter from the Parks' attorney, Prince, to Stanford 
and Buckway. (R. 224-228.) In this letter, Prince outlines the terms of the original 
REPC. (Id.) Prince characterizes Stanford's personal guarantee as "$500,000 plus 
interest" but then states that "[t]his can only be interpreted as limiting Dr. Stanford's • 
liability to the $500,000 amount." (R. 225.) Based on Prince's letter, he states that 
Stanford will be liable for $500,000 plus interest but then immediately limits Stanford's 
liability to only being interpreted as $500,000. This document, incorporated into the July 
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Trust Deed, illustrates the ambiguity of Stanford's guarantee which even the Parks 
recognized. 
The second document incorporated into the July Trust Deed was Prince's October 
11, 1994, letter to Stanford and Buckway which details some modifications to the REPC. 
(R. 230-231.) In that letter, Prince summarizes the essential terms of the deal and repeats 
his statement that Stanford's guarantee uwill be limited to a maximum liability of 
$500,000." (R. 23 L) Unlike Prince's September 27, 1994, letter he does not state that 
Stanford's guarantee is for $500,000.00 plus interest. Accordingly, this letter also 
evidences the ambiguity surrounding Stanford's guarantee and whether it also includes 
interest. 
The third document incorporated into the July Trust Deed is an October 24, 1994, 
letter from Prince to Stanford and Buckway which also served as a contract between the 
parties. The letter confirms the terms of the Ogden Property purchase and outlines the 
essential terms of the deal. (R. 233-235.) With respect to Stanford's personal guarantee, 
the document provides, "Dr. Stanford will personally guarantee the Note, but his 
guarantee will be limited to a maximum liability of $500,000." (R. 234.) Stanford, 
Buckway and the Parks all signed the October 24, 1999, agreement. (R. 235.) 
Consequently, all parties agreed that Stanford's guarantee would be limited to a 
maximum amount of $500,000.00 without anv mention of interest on that principal 
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amount. This agreement, incorporated into the July Trust Deed, also evidences the 
ambiguity of the Stanford guarantee. 
In addition to the documents incorporated into the July Trust Deed, any other 
"relevant evidence" may be considered when determining whether Stanford's guarantee is 
ambiguous. Peterson, 2002 UT 43, at % 19. In this case, Stanford, Buckway, and J.R. 
Christensen, all partners of Snowmass, stated that it was always intended that Stanford's 
maximum guarantee liability be limited to a total of $500,000.00. (R. 205; 282; 370.) 
Therefore, these statements provide further evidence that Stanford's total guarantee 
liability was to be capped at $500,000.00 total and not $500,000.00 plus interest as 
provided in the July Trust Deed. 
The July Trust Deed's guaranty provision is ambiguous. The documents and 
agreements incorporated into the July Trust Deed differ from the July Trust Deed's 
guarantee provision where they do not add interest to the $500,000.00 maximum 
guarantee. Stanford contends that the district court should not have granted summary 
judgment and awarded the Parks $508,463.91 in interest in addition to the $500,000.00 
principal guarantee amount given the uncertainty in the parties' executed documents. 
Moreover, Stanford, Buckway, and Christensen's statements that Stanford's liability was 
to be only $500,000.00 sheds further light on this ambiguity. Accordingly, the district 
court's Judgment should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the district court 
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for further proceedings to clarify whether Stanford's $500,000.00 guarantee was inclusive 
or exclusive of interest. 
In the trial court, the Parks repeatedly argued that the July Trust Deed was a fully 
integrated document and therefore the prior documents and agreements set forth above 
were superseded and effectively merged into the July Trust Deed. (R. 85-89.) The Parks 
were mistaken. 
As set forth above, the July Trust Deed contains an incorporation clause not an 
integration or merger clause. In Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 
70, ^ 27, 98 P.3d 15, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the integration clause in that case 
specifically stated it "supersedefs] all prior and contemporaneous agreements, 
negotiations and representations (written and oral)." In this case, the July Trust Deed 
contains no such language. Nowhere in the July Trust Deed does it purport to supersede 
all prior agreements between the parties, it merely incorporates the prior agreements as a 
part of that document. And, as set forth above, the incorporated documents render 
Stanford's guarantee amount ambiguous. Accordingly, the district court's Judgment and 
grant of summary judgment should be vacated. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT GIVING STANFORD CREDIT 
TOWARDS HIS $500,000.00 GUARANTY FOR PAYMENTS HE MADE TO 
THE PARKS AS A GUARANTOR 
The district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Stanford was not 
entitled to credit for over $750,000.00 in payments he personally made to the Parks as 
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Snowmass' guarantor. (R. 391-392.) At the March 13, 2006, hearing on the Parks' 
motion for partial summary judgment, the court stated that it was comfortable granting 
partial summary judgment since there was no evidence of an understanding between the 
parties with respect to the application of Stanford's payments to the Parks. (R. 781 
Hearings Tran. at 14.) In an order dated June 5, 2006, the district court stated that "as a 
matter of law, none of the payments made to date by Stanford . . . can be applied so as to 
reduce the $500,000.00 personal guaranty from Stanford to the plaintiffs." (R. 391.) 
The district court erred on two grounds: (1) when a guarantor makes a payment 
directly to the lender, that payment is credited against the guarantor's guaranty limit see 
Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v. McDonald 147 A. 627, 628 (N.J. 1929), and (2) 
when a lender accepts a payment from a guarantor or debtor, and knows that the payment 
has come from the guarantor's funds, the lender is required to apply that payment towards 
the guarantor's debt. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Inc. Co. v. Dakota Elec. Supply Co, 309 
F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1962); see also Broward County v. Cont'l Gas. Co.. 243 F. Supp. 
118 (S.D. Fla. 1965). Accordingly, the question of whether there was an agreement 
between the parties concerning how Stanford's payments should be applied is irrelevant. 
A. Stanford Should Have Been Given Credit For The Payments He 
Made To The Parks As A Guarantor 
The district court should not have entered a judgment against Stanford where he 
had already satisfied his guarantee. Stanford fulfilled his $500,000.00 guaranty7 to the 
Parks where he paid them over $750,000.00 in monthly payments as Snowmass' 
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guarantor. A guarantor's payment of a borrower's debt, to the extent it is covered by a 
contract, discharges the guarantor from farther liability. Monmouth Plumbing Supply 
Co., 147 A. at 627. While Monmouth Plumbing is not controlling precedent on this 
Court, its fact pattern is identical to that of this case and it is therefore instructive and 
persuasive.5 
In Monmouth Plumbing, the plaintiff extended credit to the defendant's son on the 
grounds that the defendant guarantee his son's account. Id. The defendant agreed and 
guaranteed his son's account up to a maximum amount of $250. [d. The son was unable 
to pay his debts to the plaintiff and the defendant paid the plaintiff a total of $268.90 on 
behalf of his son. Id. The plaintiff continued extending credit to the defendant's son until 
the son's indebtedness amounted to $462.22. Id. The defendant's son was unable to pay 
that amount and the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant based on his guarantee 
and demanded that the defendant pay him the $250 he had guaranteed. Id. The trial court 
ruled in favor of the defendant and held that the defendant's prior payment of $268.90 to 
the plaintiff discharged the defendant from any further obligation on his guarantee. Id. 
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and 
held that "[t]he accepted rule is that the payment by the guarantor of the principal debt to 
the extent that it is covered by the contract of guaranty discharges him from any farther 
5
 No cases from within this jurisdiction have yet to comment on whether a 
guarantor's payment on behalf of the borrower should be applied to offset the guarantor's 
maximum liability. 
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liability thereon." Id. at 628. The court held that the defendant's payments totaling 
$268.90, a total exceeding his $250 guarantee, "wiped out any further obligation on the 
part of the defendant with relation to the payment of his son's debt to the plaintiff." Id. 
As in Monmouth Plumbing, Stanford guaranteed a borrower's (Snowmass) debt to 
a lender (the Parks). (R. 4.) As in Monmouth Plumbing, Stanford's guarantee was 
limited to a fixed amount of $500,000.00. (Id.) As in Monmouth Plumbing, Snowmass 
was unable to make the payments as required by the REPC and July Trust Deed. (R. 205; 
211-261.) As in Monmouth Plumbing, the Parks sought payment of Snowmass' 
obligation from Stanford as the guarantor. (Id.) As in Monmouth Plumbing, Stanford 
made payments to the Parks on behalf of Snowmass with his own money in order to 
honor his personal guarantee. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.) As in Monmouth Plumbing, the 
amount Stanford paid to the Parks exceeded his guarantee maximum of $500,000.00 
where he paid them in excess of $750,000.00. (Id.) As in Monmouth Plumbing, the 
Parks brought an action against Stanford for an amount which Stanford has already paid. 
And as in Monmouth Plumbing, this Court should hold that Stanford's guaranty liability 
was extinguished by virtue of his payments to the Parks. 
The facts show that Stanford gave the Parks over $750,000.00 in payments at their 
request and on behalf of Snowmass. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.) Stanford either made those 
payments personally or transferred his funds into Snowmass' account who then made the 
payment to the Parks. (R. 159.) Based on these facts, the district court erred by not 
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applying these payments towards his $500,000.00 guaranty liability. Had the district 
court properly done so, Stanford's guaranty liability would have been "wiped out" just as 
the defendant in Monmouth Plumbing and the Parks' claim against Stanford on the 
guarantee would be without merit. 
In the district court, the Parks denied that Stanford was making payments to them 
in his capacity of a guarantor. (R. 318.) The Parks asserted that while they did receive 
payments from Stanford, there was no reference to his guarantee. (R. 317-318.) Stanford 
notes that these facts, even if true, merely create a material issue of fact which further 
supports Stanford's contention that summary judgment was inappropriate. When 
considering the Parks' motions for summary judgment, the trial court, as well as this 
Court, is obligated to view "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ^ | 6. Pursuant to this 
standard, the district court erred by refiising to apply Stanford's payments to his guarantee 
and granting the Parks' motion where a genuine issue of material fact existed. 
Additionally, Stanford asserts that the district court's ruling and resulting 
Judgment awards the Parks a double recovery on Stanford's guarantee. The court's 
Judgment gave the Parks the benefit of over $750,000.00 in payments pursuant to 
Stanford's guarantee and then allowed them to pursue Stanford for an additional 
$500,000.00 because he had not yet "honored" his guarantee. Such a ruling is 
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unconscionable and should be vacated. Moreover, to deny Stanford the benefit of his 
personal payments to the Parks renders his $500,000.00 guaranty limit meaningless. 
B. Where The Parks Knew The Payments Stanford Gave Them 
Came From Stanford They Should Have Applied Those 
Payments Towards His Guarantee Liability 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment against Stanford based on 
its conclusion that he was required to direct the Parks to apply his payments towards his 
guarantee. (R. 781 Hearings Tran. at 14.) Generally, when a lender accepts a payment 
from a guarantor, and knows that the payment has come from the guarantor, the lender is 
required to apply that payment towards the guarantor's debt. See St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Inc. Co. v. Dakota Elec. Supply Co, 309 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1962); Central Blacktop v. 
Town of Cicero, 519 N.E. 2d 972, 976 (III. App. Ct. 5th Div. 1988). In this case, the 
Parks demanded, and accepted, payments from Stanford which they knew came from him 
and therefore the Parks should have credited those payments to Stanford's guarantee. 
In Central Blacktop, a subcontractor brought an action against a surety seeking 
money due on a project. 519 N.E. 2d at 973. The Town of Cicero was also a defendant 
in the action and was the beneficiary of the plaintiffs work. Id. The plaintiff had hired a 
contractor, Joint Venture, to perform road construction, id. Cicero tendered a check to 
Joint Venture for its work on the project and Joint Venture then gave that check to 
Central Id. Joint Venture asserted that the payment to Central was made with the 
understanding that it would be applied to the Cicero account. Id. Central argued that it 
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had the option of choosing which account to apply the check. The trial court disagreed 
with Central and held that it was obligated to apply the money it received to the account 
was that was guaranteed by a surety. Id. at 975. 
On appeal, the trial court's ruling was affirmed and the Illinois Court of Appeals 
held that where the creditor knows the source of the fimds it has received, the surety has 
the right to have that payment applied towards his guaranty. Id. The decision in Central 
Blacktop is supported by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Hyland Elec. 
Supply Co. v. Franchi Bros. Const. Corp., 378 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1967), wherein the court 
held that when funds creditor receives funds it knows originated with the surety, the 
creditor must apply those funds to the guaranteed debt. The Eight Circuit Court of 
Appeals followed suit where it noted that where a surety itself makes a payment to the 
debtor and the creditor knows the debtor's funds came from the surety, that money must 
be applied to the guarantor's debt. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 309 F.2d at 25. 
Stanford acknowledges that the cases cited above differ in their factual posture 
where those cases involved a debtor who had two separate debts with a single lender. 
However, the relevant principle in those cases is applicable to the case at hand; namely, 
that when a lender knows the source of its payment is the guarantor, the lender must apply 
that payment to the guarantor's guaranteed debt. Accordingly, the operative inquiry is 
whether the lender knows the payment it receives is from a guarantor, and not whether the 
parties had an agreement as to the application of a payment. 
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In this case, as in the case of Central Blacktop, Hyland Elec, and St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Inc. Co., the district court should have focused its inquiry on whether or not the 
Parks knew the $750,000.00 they received from Stanford was actually from him and not 
Snowmass. Instead, the district court erroneously focused its inquiry on whether there 
was an agreement between the parties regarding how Stanford's payments should have 
been applied. (R. 781 Hearings Tran. at 13-14.) 
In the court below, the Parks argued that Stanford was not permitted to control the 
application which either the debtor or the creditor makes of a payment and cited the case 
of Wyandotte Coal & Lime Co. v. Wyandotte Pav. & Constr. Co, 154 P. 1012 (Kan 1916) 
in support on their contention. (R. 90.) However, Wyandotte is distinguishable where the 
debtor made the payment to the lender and the surety sought to have the debtor's payment 
applied to the debt which the surety had guaranteed. Id. at 1013. In this case, Stanford is 
not seeking credit for payments which Snowmass made to the Parks, he is seeking credit 
for payments he made, thereby removing this case from the purview of Wyandotte. 
The district court erred as a matter of law by focusing its inquiry on whether the 
Parks and Stanford had an arrangement regarding Stanford's payments. The district court 
should have focused on whether the Parks knew that Stanford was paying them personally 
rather than Snowmass. As set forth above, there was at the very least a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding this question and summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. 
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III. THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
REDUCE THE JUDGMENT AMOUNT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-1-32 
If this Court does not vacate the district court's Judgment for the reasons set forth 
above, it should still vacate the Judgment and remand the case to the district court to 
determine how much the Judgment should be reduced by pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-32 (the "Act"). The Act requires that a lender credit the fair market value of a 
property secured by a sued upon note against a borrower's debt. Pursuant to the Act, the 
Parks' Judgment against Stanford should be reduced by the difference between the fair 
market value of the Ogden Property at the time of its sale and its ultimate sale price. 
The Act provides in relevant part, 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the 
property at the date of sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses 
of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. 
U.C.A. § 57-1-32 (2008). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of this Act 
is to "prevent[] trust deed lenders from obtaining excessive recoveries." Surety Life Ins. 
Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court has also extended the 
Act's protection to guarantors. 
In Surety Life, the defendants signed a promissory note and trust deed in 
connection with a construction loan. Id. The defendants signed the note and deed in their 
official capacity as partners in a general partnership but also as personal guarantors. Id. 
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The Lender, Surety Life, later declared a default of the loan and proceeded to foreclose on 
certain property which was secured by the trust deed. Id. Surety was the only bidder at a 
trustee's sale and acquired the property for a credit bid of $1,536,000.00. Id. On the day 
of the trustee's sale, the fair market value of the property was $1,860,000.00 and the total 
unpaid balance on the promissory note was $1,839,000.00. Id. However, Surety claimed 
a deficiency of $303,000.00 and brought an action against the guarantors for the 
deficiency. Id. The trial court awarded summary judgment against the defendants. Id. 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred because the court should 
have extended the Act's protections to them as guarantors, and therefore Surety's claimed 
deficiency should have been reduced by the fair market value of the property. Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court agreed. The court stated that 4w[i]t is clear from the plain language of 
the Act that its protection apply to any action to recover the balance due on the 
obligations secured by a trust deed . . . The Act makes no distinction as to whether the 
action is brought against the debtor or a guarantor." Id. at 3. While the court ultimately 
held that Surety was barred from bringing its action against the defendants because of a 
statute of limitations, the court noted that even if the action had been timely filed, Surety 
would have been required to credit the fair market value of the property to its deficiency. 
Id. The court stated that this credit would "thereby preventf] Surety from receiving a 
double recovery from the [Defendants] as either guarantors or debtors." Id. 
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In this case, Snowmass was originally obligated to make payments to the Parks for 
amounts owing on the Security Mutual Note. (R. 154; 214; Add. Ex. C.) Stanford 
guaranteed Snowmass' obligation on the Security Mutual Note and the Note was secured 
by the Ogden Property. (Id.) However, in December of 2007, the Parks purchased the 
Security Mutual Note back. (R. 616.) The Parks later declared the Note in default and on 
June 26, 2008, their legal counsel gave notice that the Ogden Property would be sold at 
public auction to be held on July 31, 2008. (Add. Ex. A.) The Parks purchased the 
Ogden Property for $200,000.00 as the only bidders at the trustee's sale; a bargain 
considering the Parks' own expert had previously appraised the property at $425,000.00 
to $450,000.00. (R. 430-431; Add. Ex. B.) Now, with the Ogden Property in their 
possession, the Parks have also received a judgment against Stanford for over a million 
dollars, essentially receiving the double recovery the Act and the Utah Supreme Court 
have prohibited. 
The Parks' judgment should be reduced by the difference between the fair market 
value of the Ogden Property on the day of its sale and the Parks' $200,000.00 purchase 
price. As the Parks' expert testified, that Property is worth at least $425,000.00, and 
therefore at the very least, the Parks' judgment should be reduced by $225,000.00. 
However, where the Act requires that a court determine the fair market value of the 
property as of the day of sale, this Court should remand this case to the district court to 
make this determination. 
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Furthermore, Stanford should be entitled to the protections of the Act where his 
right to relief from the Ogden Property has been extinguished. This Court has recognized 
that "a guarantor, upon payment of the guaranteed obligation, has a right of subrogation 
to any collateral pledged as security." Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper Co., 907 P.2d 1179, 
1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This protection ensures that a guarantor always has collateral 
to fall back on in order to be repaid for any debts it pays. However, in this case the 
collateral is unavailable since it is now owned by the Parks. Consequently, Stanford has 
no recourse against the Ogden Property for subrogation. This fact underscores the 
importance of applying the Act's protection to Stanford. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Stanford respectfully ask this Court to vacate the district 
court's Judgment and remand the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with 
its order. 
DATED this IQ& day of November, 2008. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
Russell S. Walker 
ReidW. LMbert^ 
Anthony M. Grover 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A: Notice of Trustee's Sale 
Exhibit B: Bid Price 
Exhibit C: April 1, 1994, REPC 
Exhibit D: October 24, 1994, Agreement 
Exhibit E: July 1, 1995, Trust Deed Note 
Exhibit F: June 5, 2006, Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment 
Exhibit G: June 3, 2008, Judgment 
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I hereby certify that on the 1°"^ day of November, 2008,1 mailed two true and 
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Keith W. Meade 
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272 East 200 South, Suite 700 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
J U N - 3 0 - 2 0 0 8 WON 0 1 4 9 PM ADVANCED EYE CARE FAX No. 801 253 2 2 2 9 P. 0 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
On the 31st day of July, 2008, at the hour of 3:00 pjn., of said day, just outside the east main 
entrance of the Weber County Second District Courthouse, 2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah, Keith 
W, Meade, as Successor Trustee, will sell at public auction, to the highest bidder, for cash, in lawful 
money of the United States, all payable at the time of sale, the following described property, situated 
in the Weber County, State of Utah, and described as follows, to-wit; 
PARCEL 1; 
Part of Lots 2 and 3, Block 30, Plat "A", of Ogden City Survey: Beginning at apoint 
2 feet East from the Southwest Comer of said Lot 2 and running thence West 67.485 
feet; thence North 330 feet; thence East 65.485 feet; thence South 206 feet; thence 
East 2 feet; thence South 124 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with lA of the vacated street abutting thereon. 
01-026-0011 
PARCEL 2: 
Part of Lot 2, Block 30, Plat "A", Ogden City Survey: Beginning at a point 2 feet East 
of the Southwest Corner of said Lot 2 and running thence East 66.5 feet; thence 
North 234 feet; thence West 2.5 feet; thence North 96 feet; thence West 66 feet; 
thence South 206 feet; thence East 2 feet; thence South 124 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH a perpetual right to use the following described tract of land for 
a road way to wit: a part of Lot 9, Block 30, Plat "A", Ogden City Survey: 
Beginning at a point 2 rods West of the Northeast Corner of said Lot 9 and running thence 
South 20 rods; thence West 3 rods; thence North 12 feet, thence East 37 Vi feet; thence North 
318 feet; thence East 12 feet to the point of beginning. As created by Warranty Deed 
recorded December 17, 1884, m Book S of Deeds at Page 107. 
01-026-0010 
Said property is also known by the street address of 550 24th Street, Ogden, Ogden, UT 
84401. 
J U N - 3 0 - 2 0 0 8 MON 0 1 : 4 9 PM ADVANCED EYE CARE FAX No. 801 263 2229 P. 002 
Said sale will be made without covenant or warranty regarding title, possession or 
encumbrances to satisfy the obligation secured by and pursuant to the power of sale conferred in the 
Trust Deed dated March 12. 1992. executed by Kang S. Park, as Trustor, in which Associated Title 
Company was named as Trustee and Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska as 
Beneficiary, filed for record on March 17,1992 as Entry No. 1170790 in Book 1621, Pages 1098-
1122, Records of the County Recorder of Weber County, Utah. 
The current Beneficiary of the Trust Deed is the Kang S. Park IRA and the record owner of 
the property as of the recording of the Notice of Default is Snowmass, L.C. 
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the Trustee a $5,000.00 cashier's check at the sale and 
a cashier's check for the balance of the purchase price within 24 hours after the sale. 
DATED this filfti^ day of ULLftts 2008. 
fUL 
Keith W. Meade, Successor Trustee 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
257 East 200 South. Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Office Hours: 9:00 - 4:30 Monday - Friday 
r\LAWAYN£U KBJTH^oHc'iSnovmiMs^otKx of Tracts S«lt«vp<i 
EXHIBIT "B" 
J U M - 3 0 - 2 0 0 8 MON 0 1 : 4 9 PM ADVANCED EYE CARE FAX No. 801 263 2229 P. 0i 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
On the 31st day of July, 2008, at the hour of 3:00 p jn., of said day, just outside the east main 
entrance of the Weber County Second District Courthouse, 2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah, Keith 
W. Meade, as Successor Trustee, will sell at public auction, to the highest bidder, for cash, in lawful 
money of the United States, all payable at the time of sale, the following described property, situated 
in the Weber County, State of Utah, and described as follows, to-wit: 
PARCEL 1: 
Part of Lots 2 and 3, Block 30, Plat "A", of Ogden City Survey: Beginning at a point 
2 feet East from the Southwest Corner of said Lot 2 and running thence West 67.485 
feet; thence North 330 feet; thence East 65.485 feet; thence South 206 feet; thence 
East 2 feet; thence South 124 feat to the point of beginning-
Together with lA of the vacated street abutting thereon. 
01-026-0011 
PARCEL 2: 
Part of Lot 2, Block 30, Plat "A", Ogden City Survey: Beginning at a point 2 feet East 
of the Southwest Corner of said Lot 2 and running thence East 66.5 feet; thence 
North 234 feet; thence West 2.5 feet; thence North 96 feet; thence West 66 feet; 
thence South 206 feet; thence East 2 feet; thence South 124 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH a perpetual right to use the following described tract of land for 
a road way to wit: a part of Lot 9, Block 30, Plat "A", Ogden City Survey: 
Beguining at a point 2 rods West of the Northeast Corner of said Lot 9 and running thence 
South 20 rods; thence West 3 rods; thence North 12 feet; thence East 37 V* feet; thence North 
318 feet; thence East 12 feet to the point of beginning. As created by Warranty Deed 
recorded December 17, 1884, m Book S of Deeds at Page 107. 
01-026-0010 
Said property is also known by the street address of 550 24th Street, Ogden, Ogden, UT 
84401. 
J U N - 3 0 - 2 0 0 8 MON 01 49 PM ADVANCED EYE CARE FAX No. 801 263 2229 P. 002 
Said sale will be made without covenant or warranty regarding title, possession or 
encumbrances to satisfy the obligation secured by and pursuant to the power of sale conferred in the 
Tmst Deed dated March 12.1992. executed by Kang S. Park, as Trustor, in which Associated Title 
Company was named as Trustee and Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska as 
Beneficiary, filed for record on March 17,1992 as Entry No. 1170790 in Book 1621, Pages 1098-
1122, Records of the County Recorder of Weber County, Utah. 
The current Beneficiary of the Trust Deed is the Kang S. Park IRA and the record owner of 
the property as of the recording of the Notice of Default is Snowmass, L.C. 
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the Trustee a $5,000.00 cashier's check at the sale and 
a cashier's check for the balance of the purchase pnee within 24 hours after the sale. 
DATED this filn^ day o f ( J i X / q g > 2008. 
floJ 
Keith W. Meade, Successor Trustee 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Office Hours- 9:00 - 4:30 Monday - Friday 
r\LAWAYS£M KBJTH^iwt^Snoxvnte«t\KouccafTn«6i«xsSil^<vpd 
EXHIBIT "C" 
IB 
REALTOR* 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
TMa k a Uotly binding CofltacL Utah Sista U * nKjulnw that fcaflmi r»*J n t t U ag«nti U M thta form, but tha Buyar and the Salter may 
Wgally ag/*s In writing to altar or daJats provistofts of W« term. tfyou dasira W?al or tax advica cooauK your attomay or tax advisor 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
TneBuyers Richard Rurkway f. n»ry R Stnnfnrrf 
io Brokerage aa Earnest Money Dapostt % t O . Q U 
_ In the form o f . 
*Wun three business days after Acceptance of Una offer to purchase by ail partes 
_ offers 10 purchase the Property described below and delivers 
^
a s
^ _ _ to be depor ted 
N/A 
Brokerage Phone Number 
Received by ^ f / / y ^ > Zb/J^ A P " » 1 9 ^ 
t . PROPERTY 
City . 
550 - 2<lth Street. Oyd^n 
Oqden 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
Utah 
. County Weber Utah 
111ncluded Hems Unless excluded herein this safe shall Include ail fixtures preaeniiy attached to the Property plumbing healing air conditioning and 
venting fixtures and oqulpment, watar heater, bulK In appliances light fixtures and bulbs bathroom fixtures curtains and drapenea and rods window and 
door ecf««n$ storm doors window blinds awntngs Installed television antenna, satellite dishes end system wall lo wall carpels automatic garage door 
opener and transmitter^) fencing trees and shrubs The following personal property shall also be Included in this tale and conveyed under separate Blli of 
Sale with warranties as to title N O P e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
\2 Excluded Items The following items are excluded from this sale 
: PURCHASE PRfCE AND FINANCING Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows 
I f l flfl EarnestMonay DaposH 
Existing Loan Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan In this approximate amount presently payable at % 
par month including principal Interest (presently at % per annum) O real estate taxes O property Insurance premium 
and D mortgage Insurance premium. Buyer agrees to pay any transfer and assumption fees Seller D snail D shall not be 
released from liability on aald loan Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual 
balance af Closing ahall be adjuslad in D Cash D Other 
Proceeds from Naw Loan Buyor reserves the nght lo apply lor any ol the following loans under the terms described beiow 
D Convenilonal D FHA O VA D Other Seller agrees to pay $ toward 
Discount Points and Buyer s other loan and closing costs to be allocated at Buyer s discretion 
O For a fixed rale loan Amortized and payable over years Interest shall not exceed % per annum monthly principal and 
interest payment shall not exceed S or 
O For an Adjustable Rate Mongage (ARM) Amortized and payable over years Initial Interest rale shall not exceed _ % per 
annum initial monthly principal and Interest payments shall not exceed $ Maximum Life Time Interest rate shall not 
exceed % per annum 
Sailer Financing (See attached Seller Financing Addendum) 
other Refer to Addendumfsl 
$ _. 
s __ 
$ Batanca of Purchase Price In Cash at Closing 
$ 1f000t000.<ybtal Purchase Price 
xlating/Naw Loan Application Buyer agrees to make application for a loan specified above within calendar days {Application Oalelp 
Accepbsmya^Buyer will have made Loan Application only whan Buyer has (a) completed signed and delivered lo the Lender the initial loan appJioertTonand 
dorumeniationTa^uJred by the Lender and (b) paid all loan application leas as required by the Lender Buyer will continue to provide lh>_Bnaer with any 
additional documentatltftv^srequired by the Lender If within seven calendar days after receipt ot written request from Seller Buyei>t£ifs to provide to Seller 
whiten evidence that Buyer hajTrnade Loan Application by the Application Date then Seder may prior to the QuaHflcatlonJ>«tffbelow cancel this Contract 
by providing written notice to Buyer ir>s»Brokerage upon receipt ol a copy oi such written notice shall releaseJp*8tStler and Seller agrees to accept as 
Sellers exclusive remedy the Earnest Mon«V&<0O»N without the requirement oi any further written authpf^Suon from Buyer 
2 2 Qualification Buyer and the Proparty must qwhiy^or a loan tor which application has b M n p a d e u n d e r section 21 within calendar days 
(Qualification Data) after Acceptance The Property Is deem&d-quairlied il on or belore the Qujrrnlcatlon Dais the Proparty InitscurrentcondiuonandlOf 
the Buyer s Intended use has appraised at a value not less than theTtrwjPurchase Pr^ r 'Buyer «s deemed qualified If on or belore the Qualification Dale 
iht Lender verifies in writing that Buyer has been approved as of the venflc^jQ^roate 
2 3 Qualification Contingency If Seller has not previously voided thlsJ^owacLa>p<oviaed in Section 2 1 Bnd either the Proparty or Buyer has felted to 
qualify on or before the Qualification Date either party may canptf lms Contract by provjoTrvg^writlen notice to the other party within three calendar days 
after the Qualification Date otherwise Buyer and the Properfyare deemed qualified Tne Broker-p^^upon receipt of a copy ol such written notice shall 
telum to Buyer lha Earnest Money Deposit wlthouVttTe requirement oi any lurther written euthonzal ionlyf^Uer 
3 CLOSING This transaction shall be clo^KTrSnor belore _ 19 _ Closing sha>«ccur when (a) Buyer and Seller have 
s gned and delivered to each otherfoj-rcrfhe escrow/'tille company) all documents required by this Contract by the Lendfefvtjywritten escrow instructions 
and by applicable taw and (b>tftemonifls required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/uflfr>company in the form oi 
cashier s check col iec>dorcleared funds SellerandBuyershallea^hpeyone hall ( t /2 ) of the escrow Closing lee unless otherwise ag>e«dby the parties 
n writing TaxeXtTd assessments for Ihe current year rents and interest on assumed obligations shall b» prorated as sal forth in this SectiorTisiqearned 
depwh^-druenancios shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing Proraiions set lorth In this Section shall be made as of D dale ol Closing O daft 
(^session D other — — 
4 POSSESSION Unless otherwise agreed In writing by the parties Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within _ hours after Closing 
5 CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract the listing agent bL_A _ represents 
N / A _ represents D Seller D Buyer Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this 
fljgflfff rX i t i "^ Q J Wt fl/4ha__anpy relationship^) was provided to him/nar ( ) Buyer s Initials ( } Sailer s Initials 
" Seller O Buyer and the selling agent . 
_£f-t TO PROPERTY AN D TITLE INSURANCE (a) Seller has or shell have at Closing lee title to the Proparty and agrees to convey auch title to Buyej 
«*n«rraTfc»r«<»"«x *«>_•< <<-<^  < finarcfe' e-cunibrances, ua wmianwo u o«r Section 10 6 (b) Seliei agrees to pay tor and turnish Buyer at DpaWg with a 
current standardloTrrs-ciwner s policy of title insurance in the amount ot me Total Purchase Prica (c) the title policy shall conlorm wjlh^dTier s obligations 
undur subsections (a) and(BT'afcQye Unless otherwise agreed under subsection 8 4 the commitment shall conlorm with tn^JHtBlnsurance commitment 
provided under Section 7 
7 SELLER OfSCLOSURES No later than _ _ _ S S f c l _ r a f f l n d a r days after Acceptance Seller will delivepw-fluyer the follow ng Seller Disclosures (a) 
a Seder property condition disclosure for the Proparty 8ignW-*Qd dated by Seder (b) a commrtmenU^rlhe policy of title insurance required under Section 
6 to be issued by the tWe Insurance company chosen by Seller mclu?rtT>££Opies oi all docyi^attfslisted as Exceptions on the Commitment (c) a copy of all 
loan documents relating to any loan now existing which wl I incumber thePT&prjitj^Tter Closing and (d) a copy ol all leases affecting the Proparty not 
expiring prior to Closing Seller agrees to pay any l lie cominttmeni canc>te-l5n charge^TwdQrsuOsection (o) 
6 GCNER AL CONTINGENCIES In addition lo Qualification u n d e ^ ^ l i o n 2 2 this ofter is (a) subiecTte^Bj^er s approval o» the content ol each of the nems 
iftlerenced in Section 7 above and(b) O l s Olsnotsubje^tto '^uyersapprova oi an inspection ol the Propat tY^e inspec t ion shall be paid lor by Buyer 
and shall be conducted by an Individual/compajj^ofBuyer s cho ce Seller agrees lo fully cooperate with such tnspe^TTjrs^ic^a walk through inspection 
under Section 1 \ and lo make the Prope^f^val lable lor the same 
8 i Buyer shall have _____^>>«tfbar days alter Acceptance In which to review the co< Seller D sclosures and If the inspectiotr-e<uilingency 
aopl es r
 r ^ v | e e ajjo^ifTaluate Ihe Inspection 0 l the Property and to oeier nnc K n b sole discretion the content o i Seller Dlsciofr 
( r o i Q
 f>fttferty Inspection) is acceptable 
5
 JL£»—^ »os not del vera written objection lo Seller regard ng a Set e D.b ' s e-onhePrope , tact ion within <het«noDtc\ sudseclion 8 i 
I n n i f g i r> -n r f h r ^ ' g ° ^ r ^ a " W C a l > f ' f f K f f l "h f t - ^ f f iY r tn r r i l nn r l r i r r l n l .ter receipt ofthe objections to resolve Buyer sobieciions Seller m ^ a b a l U * 
ha required to. resoiveTJUj'Ui'j i i^uUlOCiJJBtyyer'* objections are not resolved within (he seven calendar days Buyrrrnny vmii Hill,' I ' iml iTr l Dy pre vidmg 
written notice to Seller within the same t e v c 7 c a T e ^ q m ^ y f c _ I £ g j ^
 M | „ t \\\\yjtl buyers written notice shall return to Buyer the 
I tstn+ti Money Oepoul without the fequirementof any lyrth"- t T ^ m ^ ^ n f a r ^ T ^ c n | ^ £ r j < ^ v ^ r ^ r r 1 j s n o l v 0 ,ded by Buyer Buyer s objection is deemed to have been vyaiyjflLiiuw'eiui ui'fi waiverdoes not affect those items warranted in SeckorTT 
fToTBuyers objections under Section 8 3 shall beJn writing and shall be sppcffically enforceable e 
tto Refer to Addendums / Exh ib l is 
Kmg order and in corr pliance 
9 as covenants 6T! 
i SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES This offer >s made subject to *erer io Aqaenaums/ ExniDits 
The t«rrm of attached Addendum f * are Incorporated Into this Contract by this reference R e f e r t o A d d e n d u m s / E x h i b i t S 
I 10 SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES Sellers warranties to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited (o the following 
I 1 0 1 When seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer tt will be broom clean and free of debris and personal belongings 
Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer wrth the plumbing plumbed fixtures heating cooling ventilating electrical and s p a r e r 
tyttemsap'ptaQces and fireplaces In working order — ' " ^^ 
10 3 Seller will denvw^ssess lon of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Salter 
10 4 Seller will deliver posjeSjtOQof the Property to Buyer with any private weft or septic tank serving the Property u 
with governmental regulations 
105 Sailer will be responsible for repairing any*Df"6>£^ar s moving related damage to lhe Proper} 
10.6 At Closing Seller will bring current ail financial obligStrw^encumberlng the Proptrjy-tftuch are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge all 
such obligations which Buyer has not ao assumed and 
10 7 As of Closing Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notlcejjL*<r^vTft7r>«^ntal building or zoning code violation regarding the Property which 
hat not boon resolved 
V VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLU^CC ITEMS Before Closing Buyer may c o n o ^ ^ a v v a l k through" Inspection of the Property to 
determine whether or not items warrantgjifcfS'eJier in Section 10 1 102 10 3 and 10 4 are in the warranted cotaMiqnend to verify items included in Section 
11 are presently on the Propejiy-lfany item Is not in the warranted condition Seller wl(i correct repair or replace lta5>K»cfi8sary or with the consent of 
Buyer escrow arnyjiownfat Closing to provide for such repair or replacement The Buyer s failure to conduct e "walk ihrougTrSttsjjection oi to otaim 
during th^^r t f lk lhrough inspection ihal 1he Property does not Include all Items referenced in Section 1 1 or Is not In the condition warrartwdj^ Section 
fl not constitute a waiver by Buyer of Buyer s rights under Section 1 1 or of the warranties contained In Seclion 10 
12 CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION Seller agrees mat no changes In any existing leases shall be made no new leases entered into and no substantial 
tltoraUons or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer 
13 AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS 11 Buyer or Seller Is a corporation partnership trust estate or other entity the person executing this Contract on Its behall 
warrants his or her aulhorlly to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
14 COMPLETE CONTRACT This instrument together with rts addenda any attached exhibits and Seller Disclosures constitute the entire Contract 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations representations warranties understandings or contracts between the 
parties This Contracl cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties 
15 OlSPUTE RESOLUTION The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract Including but not limited to the disposition of the Eam««! 
Money Daposlt Ihe breach or termination of Ihis Contracl or the services relating to this transaction 6hall first be submitted to mediation tn a cordance 
with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules ol the American Arbitration Association Disputes shall Include representations made by the 
parties »ny Broker or other person or entity in connection with the sale purchase financing condition or other aspect of Ihe Property to which this Contracl 
pertains including without limitation allegations ol concealment misrepresentation negligence and/or Iraud Each party agrees to bear its o *n costs ol 
mediation Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to ihe mediation shall be binding ll mediation l&its the procedures applicable and remedies 
available under this Contracl ahail apply Nothing In this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable reiiel pending mediation % 
marking this box O and adding their initials theBuyerf ) andtheSeller( } agree that mediation underthls Section 15 is not mandatory butis 
optional upon agreement of all parties 
16 DEFAULT If Buyer defaults Seller may elect to either retain the E«rn«»t Mon»y Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money Oepo«H 
and sue Buyer to enforce Setter 8 rights If Seller defaults In addition to return of the Earnest Money Oeposlt Buyer may elect to either accept lr Dm Seller as 
liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earntst Money D«posit o to sue Seller lor specific performance and /or damages If Buyer elects to accepune 
liquidated damages Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand Where a Section ol this Contract provides a specllic remedy me 
parties Intend that tne remedy 6haM be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law 
17 ATTORNEY S FEES in any action arising out of this Contract the prevailing pany shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney s lees 
1B DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY The Eamasf Money Oepo«lt shall not be released unless it is authorized by (a)Section2 Section 8 3 or Section 
15 (b) separate written agreement of the parties or (cl court order 
15 Aftf tOOailOH Except lui UAPHUJ ntnrantit-3 wedt-w frne •OowtreM <*•>» p » w » » » » < < i M C#*4—t Shall ^»< ftftft'y zlutc£itt«\fi% 
20 RISK OF LOSS All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing 
21 TIMEISOF THE ESSENCE Time is ofthe essence regarding the dates settortn in this transection Extensions must be agreed torn writ ng by eli parties 
Porlormance under each Seclion of this Contracl which relerences a date shad be required absolute^ by 6 00 PM Mountain Tim» on the stated date 
22 FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS Facsimile transmission o< any signed original document and retransmission ol any signed lacsimile transmission 
»' io" bs K s ss~"S as dotiuary o» »n original M the transaction involves multiple Buyers or Sellers facsimile transmissions may be executed m counterparts 
2J. ACCEPTANCE Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer responding loan ofler or counterot«ero< meome \ai S g ~ s ' K e e " n f " " h u n t e r where noted 
to indicate acceptance and (b) communicates to the otnei party or tne other pany s agent lh8l the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required 
24 OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE Buyer oilers to purchase the Property on the above terms end conditions If Seller does not a^ce pi this offer by 
1 0 Q A M C^PM Mountain Time A p r i l 3 , 19 9*1 this oiler shall lapse and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money 
DeposJMOlBuyer 
(Ofler Date) ^&l5yWPsf|Jrl!% 
The above date shall be the Offer Ref*renc« Dat« 
^ G A R Y B. ST7 S ANFORD <o»"Oaie) 
3RPEW" 
(Notice Address) (Phone) (Notice Address/ 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER 
CHECK ONE 
D Acceptance of Offer to Purchase Seller Accepts the foregoing ofler on the terms and conditions specified ebo^e t_i cceptance l ffer t  urchase eller ccepts 
4*mmmcmw& K . S . P A R K <Da,e> <T me| 
j^tnL 
(Sailer s Signature) 
JA*LZMUA^ 
ARSHA PARK' 
(Notice Address) 
CI Rejection Seller RajecU the foregoing ofler . 
(Notice Address) 
_ [Seller :> OK als). (Oa(e) 
L~J Counter Offer Seller presents lor Buyer s Acceptance the terms o( Buyer s oltei subject to the e*.cep< ons 01 modd nations as SQQC I ed n the attached 
Counter Otter * 
f > eue2o f2pa B es Seller a initials ( ) Dale Buyer s Initial* ( } Date 
THIS f OftM A^flOveO BY THE UTAH * E . L tSTAT£ C0UMKS.O* AND THE Off ,Cf or XHC UTAH ATTO«NEr G E N I A L J O N £ 1 M J 
AL -NDUM # __1_ /COUNTER OFFER h _ 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is an ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date 
0 f __________ , 19 , including all addenda and counter offers, 
between . ______________ as Buyer, 
and , as Seller 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the 
REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same 
____J_l__The Buyers are Richard Buckway and Gary B. Stanford,, or Assigns (to our corporation). 
2) The Buyers rwTill sign an All-inclusive Trusc Deed with Rent Assignments and an All-
Inclusive Promisory Note for $1,000,000.00 with Richard Buckway and Gary B. Stanford as 
Makers and K. S. Park and Marsha Park as Holders. The Note will be repaid as follows: 
a) Five Hundred Thousand Dollars of the $1,000,000.00 note will be paid at an 
interest rate of Seven percent (7%) with a 30 year amortization. Commencing August 1, 1994, 
the monthly note payment on this portion of the loan will be $3,326.51, payable to the 
Parks at the following Address: 1760 South 2500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 in 
Certified Funds. During only May 1994, June 1994, and July 1994, the monthly payment due 
the Parks will be 2,172.48. An Additional $3,362.09 ($3,326.51 - $2,172.48 X three months) 
will be added onto the One Million Dollar Note. 
b) Five Hundred Thousand Dollars of the Million Dollar Note amount will be interest 
free for Twenty Four Months or until May 1, 1996. At that time, m twenty four months, the 
interest rate will be set at seven percent for the term of balance of the 20 year financing, 
and the payments will then be increased to $6,650.00 for the balance of the term of the 
(continued on page 2).. 
[ j Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until [ ] A M [ ] P M Mountain Time, , 19 to accept 
these terms in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse 
DEF 0242 
( ] Buyer ( ] Seller Signature 
[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature 
Date 
Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER 
At- ^ tNDUM # _J? /COUNTER OFFER „ __ 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is an ADDENDUM /COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date 
of ... . 19 including all addenda and counteroffers, 
between . , as Buyer, 
and —— . , as Seller 
The fol lowing terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the 
REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same 
loan. The entire One Million Dollar loan balance, plus interest, will be due (20) Twenty 
c) Monthly payments on the note will be due on the first day of each month. If the 
monthly payments are not received by the tenth of the month there will be a late fee in the 
amount of five percent (5%). 
3) Gary B. Stanford will personally guarantee the payment of $500,000.00 plus interest 
and Richard Buckway will personally guarantee payment of the entire $1,000,000.00 note 
plus interest. 
4) The Buyers specifically agree that in order to induce the Sellers to provide financing 
for the sale of the Building, the Buyers hereby agree that they will not sell, transfer, 
convey, contract to sell, mortgage, encumber, hypothecate, or otherwise assign any real or 
personaal property encumbered by the All-inclusive Trust Deed Whether by lease option, 
option to purchase, contract deed, or otherwise without the written consent and permission 
of the Sellers, and that if they do so the Sellers shall have the right to declare any and 
all amounts due under the One Million Dollar Note immediately due and payable without 
continued on page 3... 
[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until [ J A M [ j P M Mountain Time, ,19 to accept 
these terms in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse 
DEF 0243 
| Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date 
I Buyer [ j Seller Signature Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER 3i^ 
k J E N D U M # ___1___ /COUNTER OFFER . _ 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is an ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date 
of • , 19 including all addenda and counter offers, 
between • ___ __ , as Buyer, 
and _ . ., as Seller 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the 
REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same 
regard to the maturity date. Also, in the event that the Buyers pledge the mortgaged propert 
as security for the repayment of any obligation, the Sellers shall have the right to declare 
any and all amounts due under the One Million Dollar Note to be immediatley due and payable 
without regard to the maturity date. The Ogden 550-24th Street Building wil serve as the 
primary collateral for the One Million Dollars Note and Trust Deed. 
5) The Buyers agree to purchase the Building in its "as-is-where-is" condition with all its 
faults, and further acknowledge that the Sellers have made no representation or warranties 
the Buyers regarding the building, its value or the operation thereof. 
6. The Buyers have received and are aware of that certain Deed of Trust and Security 
Agreement dated March 12, 1992 between K. S. Park and Security Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of Lincoln, Nebraska, and hereby agree to be responsible for any and all obligations 
of the Trustor as detailed in said instrument. The Buyers also agree to fully indemnify the 
Sellers against any loss or claim that may result in the event of a call on the First Trust 
Deed by Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska or their Assigns. The 
present balance on the Security Mutual Life Insurance Company Note is $266,484.40 as of 
Continued... 
[ ] Seller [ j Buyer shall have until [ JAM [ j P M Mountain Time, , 19 to accept 
these terms in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC Unless so accepted this offer shall lapse 
DEF 0244 
[ ] Buyer ( ] Seller Signature Date 
[ j Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION /COUNTER OFFER XHU 
/ ENDUM # ________ /COUNTER OFFER . 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is an ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date 
of — _ . . . , 19 including alt addenda and counter offers, 
between __ _ _ as Buyer, 
and _ _ _ . as Seller 
The fol lowing terms are hereby incorporated as part oi the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conffict with any provisions of the 
REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not moditied shall remain the same 
March I, 1994. The Buyers further understand and agree that in the event of any call, they 
will immediately seek and obtain a new loan to replace the First Trust Deed in an amount 
not to exceed the then present Security Mutual Life Insurance Company loan balance. 
7) The Sellers agree to subordinate to a new loan in the event of a call by the Security 
Mutual Life Insurance Company for an amount equal to the then-existing principal balance 
plus any closing costs of the First Trust Deed at the time of a call. Any subordination 
will only be based upon a new loan with an interest rate not to exceed nine percent (9%) , 
and an amortization period of no less than Twenty Five (25) years. 
8) The Buyers have received copies of certain contracts between the Sellers and Utah Legal 
Services, ISAT, and C-21 Gage Froerer Real Estate Company. (Refer to copies of the completed 
contracts). 
9) The Closing shall occur on or before April 15, 1994, or as soon thereafter as the legal 
councel or title comuany has rnmnleted the closing documentation. Prorati; 
shall be as 
of April 15, 1994, or the actual date of closing if the documents are not ready on or before 
April 15, 1994. 
continued... 
[ J Seller ( ] Buyer shall have until [ J A M [ ] P M Mountain Time, ,, , 19 to accept 
these terms in accordance with Section 23 ot the REPC Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse 
DEF 0245 
[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date 
| Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER aif. 
A _NDUM#__> /COUNTEROFFER _ 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is an ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date 
of . 19 including all addenda and counter offers, 
between _____ _____ , as Buyer, 
and — _ _______ ____ , as Seller 
1 he fol lowing terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the 
REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same 
10) The Parks will not provide title insurance for the Sale. The Buyers may order title 
insurance at their sole cost. 
11) The only keys to the building are presently located at Gage Froerer Real Estate Company. 
12) No lease deposit monies from either Utah Legal Services or ISAT will be transferred 
from the Sellers to the Buyers, but will be credited against the unpaid balance. 
13) The Buyers are Richard Buckway and Gary B. Stanford, signing and guaranteeing both 
both jointly and as individuals. (As per item //3 of this contract). 
14) The documents signed this date represent the entire agreement between the parties. 
.5) The Buyers acknowledge the receipt of the following documents: ISAT Lease, Utah Legal 
Services Lease, C-21 Gage Froerer Contract, Deed of Trust and Security Agreement dated 
3-12-1992 between K. S. Park and Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska, 
and a copy of the Title Insurance Policy issued in. 1992 by Associated Title on the subject 
DroDertv to the Sellers. 
( ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until [ JAM [ ] P M Mountain Time, ,19 to accept 
these terms in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse 
DEF 0246 
[ j Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date 
[ J Buyer { ] Seller Signature Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER 
:h£i_,K ONE 2W/J 
EXHIBIT "D" 
F R E D E R I C K S. P R I N C E , J R . 
LAWYER 
CITY CENTRE 1. SUITE 900 
175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 841 1 1 
TELEPHONE (801) 524-1000 
FAX (801) 524-1098 
EXHIBIT 
10 
ALSO AOMfTTED 
tN CAUf ORNIA 
October 24, 1994 
Mr, Richard Buckway 
Dr. Gary B. Stanford 
550 24th Street, Suite 110 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
RE* Buckway-Stanford Purchase from K.S. and Marsha Park 
Gentlemen: 
This will confirm our agreement to modify the payment terms of 
the Real Estate Purchase Contract between yourselves and my 
clients, Dr. and Mrs. Park. The essential terms of the agreement 
will be as follows: 
1. The $1,000,000 purchase price will be reduced to 
$900,000. 
2. The monthly payments shall be scheduled as follows: 
4. 
From May 1, 1994 through April, 1995 
From May 1, 1995 through October, 1996 
From November 1, 1996 through the date 
upon which the Security Mutual Note 
is paid 
Thereafter, until paid in full 
$2,172.48 
3,325.61 
6,650.00 
5,604.83 
A schedule showing amounts and application of all 
payments is attached hereto as Exhibit ffAu and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
There will be no interest charged on the last $400,000 
portion of the Note until November 1, 1996. 
Past due payments for September and October, 1994 will be 
paid by cashier's check upon your written assent to these 
modifications. 
You will exercise your best efforts to assume the Note at 
Security Mutual, such assumption to be accomplished 
within sixty (60) days. It is understood that such 
,M=*> 
Mr. Richard Buckway 
Dr, Gary B. Stanford 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
October 24, 1994 
Page 2 
assumption will not relieve the Parks from liability 
under the Security Mutual Note. Payments on the Note, 
until its due^'date, will be made by the Parks. 
7. Concurrently with the assumption of the Security Mutual 
Note, the Parks will convey the property to. Snowmass 
Highland Corp., a Utah corporation, by Special Warranty 
Deed, subject to a Second Deed of Trust to secure a Trust 
Deed Note containing the above terms. 
8 . The property is presently encumbered by a Trust Deed in 
favor of Security Mutual Life Insurance Company in the 
original principal amount of $265,961, payable, including 
interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum, in 
monthly payments of $2,172. During the existence of this 
loan, the Parks will continue to make the payments. As 
you know, the SMLIC Note has a balloon payment payable of 
the entire unpaid principal in 7 years. The first 
portion of your Note to the Parks has a balloon just 
before this SMLIC balloon, so the Parks will have the 
funds to make this SMLIC balloon payment. In order to 
assist you in making this balloon payment, the Parks have 
agreed to subordinate to a new First Trust Deed Note. 
Any such Note must be based upon an interest rate not to 
exceed nine percent (9%) per annum and an amortization 
period of no less than 25 years, and must be m an amount 
not exceeding the then principal balance of the SMLIC 
Note plus closing costs. 
9. Mr. Buckway will personally guarantee the Trust Deed 
Note. Dr. Stanford will personally guarantee the Note, 
but his guarantee will be limited to a maximum liability 
of $500,000. 
10. You will timely pay the insurance premiums due on the 
present policy, and, after closing, you wiLl instruct the 
insurer to provide Dr. and Mrs. Park with an endorsement 
naming them as a co-insured as their interests may 
appear. 
I will prepare a standard Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed. All 
documents will be delivered through an escrow to be established at 
a mutually acceptable title company. 
Mr, Richard Buckway 
Dr. Gary B. Stanford 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
October 24, 1994 
Page 3 
If the foregoing is satisfactory to you, please sign and 
return two copies of this letter to me. I will secure the 
signatures of Dr. and .Mrs. Park and will return a fully executed 
original to you. 
Very truly ycmrs;, 
FSP/slp 
Attachment: Exhibit "A" 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED: 
Dated: /$ " l4 ' ^ 
Dated: /Q/M A 
Richard Buckway /^I 
u^-vL- >^ iJ^l^»-W-ui 
Gary 6>. Stanford, D.D.S 
AGREED AMU ACCEPTED. 
Dated: /W# 
Dated: 10 Z5~9? %AA. 
EXHIBIT "E" 
EXHIBIT 
TRUST DEED NOTE IS. 
$645,683.27 July 1, 1995 
Ogden, Utah 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, SNOWMASS, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, ("Borrower" herein) promises to pay to the order of Kang 
S. Park and Marsha Park, and the successors and assigns of such 
lenders ("Lender" herein), the principal sum of SIX HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE and 27/100 DOLLARS 
($645,683.27) with interest thereon from July 1, 1995, computed on 
monthly balances on the basis of a 365-day year, at the rates set 
forth on Exhibit nAff attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
this reference. Principal and interest shall be payable in lawful 
money of the United States, by Certified or Cashierfs Check, at 
such place as any holder hereof may designate in writing. 
Principal and interest shall be due and payable as set forth 
on Exhibit MA.lf Monthly payments on Exhibit "A" will amortize this 
loan and amounts stated as payable to Security ' Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, the holder of an underlying First Trust Deed. 
Monthly payments shall include any additional amounts required by 
Security Mutual for pro rations and reserves. The holder of this 
note shall be responsible to make all payments on the Security 
Mutual Life Insurance note, and shall be responsible for any and 
all late charges on the Security Mutual note so long as payment has 
been received from Borrower in accordance with the terms contained 
herein. As described on Exhibit "A," the monthly payments shall be 
scheduled as follows: 
From August 1, 1995 through October, 1996 $3,325.61 
From November 1, 19 9 6 through the date 
upon which the Security Mutual 
Note is paid in full $6,650.00 
Thereafter, until paid in full $5,604.83 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the 
balance to the reduction of principal. Any such installment not 
paid when due (including the portion attributable to the Security 
Mutual note) shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of fifteen 
percent (15%) per annum until paid. A late fee of 5% of the amount 
due will be assessed if a payment is not received by the 10th day 
of any month. 
The obligations of this Note shall be joint and several. 
Borrower and Borrower's legal representatives, successors, and 
assigns, and all endorsers and persons liable or to become liable 
on this Note, severally and expressly waive diligence, presentment, 
demand, protest, notice of any kind whatsoever, and any exemption 
under any homestead exemption laws or any other exemption or 
insolvency laws. Every such person further hereby consents to any 
extension of the time of payment hereof or other modification of 
the terms of payment of this Note, the release of all or any part 
of the security herefor, or the release of any party liable for the 
payment of the debt evidenced hereby at any time and from time to 
time at the request of anyone now or hereafter liable therefor. 
Any such extension or release may be made without notice to any of 
such persons and without discharging their liability. 
By his signature, individually, on this note, Gary B. Stanford 
agrees to unconditionally guarantee the payment of this note, but 
in no event shall Gary B. Stanford's liability (excluding portions 
thereof attributable to interest and costs) when added to any 
deficiency judgment which may be entered against him by virtue of 
his guaranty of the Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. note 
(excluding interest and costs), exceed the sum of FIVE HUNDRED 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($500,000). 
This Note has b&an issued pursuant to and is secured by that 
certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents dated July 1, 1995 
between Borrower and Lender (the "Security Instruments"). Such 
Security Instruments and all other instruments evidencing or 
securing the indebtedness hereunder are hereby made part of this 
Note and are deemed incorporated herein in full. Any default which 
continues beyond any applicable grace period stated in the Security 
Instruments or in any condition, covenant, obligation, or agreement 
contained in any of the Security Instruments shall constitute a 
default under this Note and shall entitle Lender to accelerate the 
maturity of the entire indebtedness hereunder and take such other 
actions as may be provided for in the Security Instruments or in 
this Note. 
In any action or proceeding to recover any sum herein provided 
for, no defense of adequacy of security or that resort must first 
be had to security or to any other person shall be asserted. All 
of the covenants, provisions, and conditions herein contained are 
made on behalf of, and shall apply to and bind the respective 
distributees, personal representatives, successors, and assigns of 
the parties hereto, jointly and severally. Each and every party 
signing or endorsing this Note binds himself as principal and not 
as surety. 
It is the intent of Borrower and Lender to comply at all tiroes 
with the usury and other applicable United States federal laws or 
laws of the State of Utah (to the extent not preempted by federal 
law, if any) now or hereafter governing the interest payable on 
this Note or the Security Instruments, to the extent any of the 
same are applicable hereto. If the laws of the State of Utah or 
the United States are revised, repealed, or judicially interpreted 
so as to render usurious any amount called for under this Note or 
the Security Instruments, or any other instrument contracted for, 
charged, taken, reserved, or received with respect to the 
indebtedness secured or evidenced hereby, or the maturity of this 
Note is accelerated as herein provided, or if any prepayment by 
Borrower results in Borrower's having paid any interest in excess 
2 
of that permitted by law, then it is Borrower's and Lender's intent 
thai:, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in 
this Note or in the Security Instruments (a) all excess amounts 
theretofore collected by Lender be credited to the principal 
balance of this Note (or, if this Note has been paid in full, 
refunded to Borrower) , and (b) the provisions of this Note 
immediately be deemed reformed, and the amount thereafter 
collectible hereunder and thereunder reduced, without necessity of 
the execution of any new document, £o as to comply with the then 
applicable law. 
The nonexercise by the holder of any of the holder's rights 
hereunder in any instance shall not constitute a waiver thereof in 
that or any subsequent instance« If this Note is placed in the 
hands of an attorney for collection after any default, Debtor 
promises to pay all costs of collection and a reasonable sum as 
attorneys1 fees, whether suit is brought or not. 
Time is of the essence of this Note and of the payments and 
performances hereunder and under the Security Instruments in 
connection herewith. 
This Note is to bs construed in all respects and enforced 
according to the laws of the State of Utah, 
SNOWMASS, L.C., 
a Utah limited liability company 
By: QTVAA^ . b, ^JT^J^miL^ 
Gary^k. Stanford  
Managing Member 
By : fC^cJi^^Utj 
Richard Buckvay 
Managing Member 
Richard Buckway, Individually 
ary <«. G Stanford, Individually, 
as limited in this Note. 
Note approved as to form: 
Kan| S/Park .(Leiide'r)" 
Marsha Park 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
FILED BSSTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN - 5 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By-
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KANG S. PARK and MARSHA PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY B. STANFORD, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 050900073 
Judge: Anthony B. Quinn 
This matter came before the Court on Monday, March 13, 2006, at 9:00 a.m. The plaintiff 
was represented by counsel Keith VV. Meade. The defendant was represented by counsel M Darin 
Hammond. 
The Court, having consideied the pleadings filed m connection with the plaintiffs" Motion 
for Summary Judgment, including all of the affidavits filed by the defendant, and having considered 
the discussion ofcounsel, and otherwise being advised in the matter, and for the additional reasons 
articulated by the Court during the course of the hearing, 
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Court determines, as a matter of law, that none of the payments made to date by-
Gary Stanford or Snowmass can be applied so as to reduce the $500,000.00 personal guaranty from 
Stanford to the plaintiffs. 
2. The Court believes, at present, that it cannot determine as a matter of law that there 
would not be a deficiency judgment in favor of Security Mutual should Snowmass, LLC default on 
its obligation to Security Mutual, and for that reason, the Court denies the balance of the plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which requested a determination of the principal amount which 
remains owing on the defendant's personal guaranty. 
• o£ March* 2006. DATED this b day < 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT : 
Darin Hammond 
Smith Knowles 
Attorneys for Defendant 
W& 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage fully prepaid, on the pLo day of March, 2006, to the following: 
M. Darin Hammond 
SMITH KNOWLES 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
F L-\V\* \YNb kEITH Paik'Sianfoid^oiderpioposed intendment wpd 
EXHIBIT "G" 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813 
keith@,crsla w. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By. 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
FILES BI8TRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN ~ 3 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY \ ^[(fc? 
Deputy Clerk 
*-'* L 2 
DATE j Q J 
[N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KANG S. PARK and MARSHA PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY B. STANFORD, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 050900073 
Judge: Anthony B. Quinn 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on Tuesday, April 29, 2008. The plaintiffs 
were represented by counsel, Keith VV. Meade, of Cohne, Rappaport 81 Segal. The defendant was 
represented by counsel, M. Darin Hammond, of Smith Knowles. 
The Court, having considered the pleadings Fded by the patties, as well as pleadings 
previously filed in this matter, as well as the argument of counsel, and having determined that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact based upon the pleadings previously filed and fded in 
connection with this motion, 
Judgment @J 
050900073 STANFORD.GARYB P 3 9 e S 
-\o& 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
i. The plaintiffs be and hereby are awarded judgment against the defendant, Gary B. 
Stanford m the following amounts. 
a. $500,000.00 principal; 
b. $285,401.98 in accrued interest on principal through January 31, 
2008; 
c. $190,722.95 in accrued interest on delinquent payments through 
January 31, 2008; and 
d. $5,842.98 in accrued interest on late fees, said amount taking into 
consideration the $5,000.00 reduction set forth m the plaintiffs' 
January 3, 2007 Memorandum; and 
e. $14,169.00 in additional accrued interest on principal through April 
30, 2008; and 
f. $12,627.00 in additional accrued interest on delinquent payment 
through April 30, 2008. 
The total of the foregoing is $1,008,463.91, together with judgment at the default rate provided in 
the Note of 15% per annum, plus costs of collection. 
2. hi addition, the plaintiffs have submitted a Memorandum of Costs, and the plaintiffs 
are further awarded those costs in the amount of $1,408.44. 
i 
3. The TOTAL JUDGMENT is $1,009,872.35 plus interest at the default rate of 15% 
per annum as provided for in the guaranteed note and writ of collection, all until paid. 
4. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs endorse on the face of the original Note 
given by Snowmass, LLC to Security Mutual Life Insurance Company the following" "The right to 
obtain a deficiency judgment based on this Note has been waived pursuant to the judgment entered 
in Civil No. 050900073 in the Third District Court, Salt Lake City, State of Utah in the matter 
entitled Kang S. Park and Marsha Park v Gary B. Stanford" The endorsement shall be placed on 
the Note as reflected in Exhibit "A" attached to this Judgment. 
< of May, 2008. DATED this **? day < 
BY THE COURT^*- , . 
fonorable^Anthony B. Quinn' 
District Quirt, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT 
) 
was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the C \ day of May, 2008, to the following: 
M. Darin Hammond 
SMITH KNOWLES 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
4" 
F I AW \ » NE 1 KEITH Pa.k Stanford JUDGMFNT wpd 
